Most of my research falls into one of two areas: first-person thought and the philosophy of time.
In first-person thought, I am interested in arguments for and against uniquely de se content, the role of de se content in action explanation, modelling de se communication and updating, and the relation between de se content and the nature of the self. From 2016 to 2019, I was Principal Investigator for the Leverhulme International Network Project What’s So Special about First-Person Thought? Details on the project are available here.
In philosophy of time, I am interested in debates about the nature of persistence, debates about the ontology of time, questions concerning in what sense the future is open, and questions about how temporal experience squares with our best physical theories of time. Recently I am particularly interested in the inter-relation between the metaphysics of the future, the semantics of future contingents, and future-directed attitudes such as knowledge, belief, and uncertainty about the future.
I welcome enquires from prospective postgraduate students interested in researching these (or related) topics.
Edited Volume
About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication (edited with Manuel Garcia-Carpintero) Oxford University Press, 2016. |
Papers
| Wondering about the Future, Philosophical Studies, 179, 2449–2473 (2022). PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version |
| The Growing Block, the Open Future, and Future Truths, Disputatio, forthcoming. PhilArchive Preprint for a Book Symposium on Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz’s Nothing to Come |
| First-Person Imaginings, unpublished manuscript. PhilArchive Preprint |
| What is Special about De Se Attitudes?, in Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference, Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson eds. Routlege 2020 (with Clas Weber). |
| De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles, Inquiry, 2019, (with Clas Weber). PhilArchive Preprint |Published Version |
| In Defense of De Se Content, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January (2017). PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version |
| De Se Thought and Communication—An Introduction, in About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre, eds. Oxford University Press, 2016. Local File| Published Version |
| Restricted Diachronic Composition and Special Relativity, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66 (2015) (Published Online 2013), 235-255. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version |
| The Open Future, Philosophy Compass, 6/5 (2011), 360–373. PhilArchive Preprint| Published Version |
| Centered Assertion, Philosophical Studies, 150 (2010), 97-114. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version |
| Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,80 (2010), 112-132. PhilArchive Preprint| Published Version |
| Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time, Philosophical Studies, 142 (2009), 325-344. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version |
| De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being, Faith and Philosophy, April (2006), 191-200. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version |
| Review of Debates in the Metaphysics of Time, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, Analysis, 2016, 76 (2): 256-259. Local file | Published Version |
| Review of Representing Time: an Essay on Temporality as Modality by K. M. Jaszczolt, Analysis, 2010, 70(2): 385-387. |
| Review of Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content by Neil Feit, Protosociology, 2010, url: http://www.protosociology.de/reviews.html |