Most of my research falls into one of two areas: first-person thought and the philosophy of time.

In first-person thought, I am interested in arguments for and against uniquely de se content, the role of de se content in action explanation, modelling de se communication and updating, and the relation between de se content and the nature of the self. From 2016 to 2019, I was Principal Investigator for the Leverhulme International Network Project What’s So Special about First-Person Thought? Details on the project are available here.

In philosophy of time, I am interested in debates about the nature of persistence, debates about the ontology of time, questions concerning in what sense  the future is open, and questions about how temporal experience squares with our best physical theories of time. Recently I am particularly interested in the inter-relation between the metaphysics of the future, the semantics of future contingents, and future-directed attitudes such as knowledge, belief, and uncertainty about the future.

I welcome enquires from prospective postgraduate students interested in researching these (or related) topics.

Edited Volume

Cover for About Oneself
About Oneself:
De Se Thought and Communication
(edited with Manuel Garcia-Carpintero) Oxford University Press, 2016.


Knowledge of the Future and Reliable Belief-Forming Processes, forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Local File
Wondering about the Future, Philosophical Studies, 179, 2449–2473 (2022). PhilArchive PreprintPublished Version
First-Person Imaginings, unpublished manuscript. PhilArchive Preprint
What is Special about De Se Attitudes?, in Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference, Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson eds. Routlege 2020 (with Clas Weber).
De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles, Inquiry, 2019, (with Clas Weber). PhilArchive Preprint |Published Version
In Defense of De Se Content, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January (2017). PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version
De Se Thought and Communication—An Introduction, in About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre, eds. Oxford University Press, 2016. Local File| Published Version
Restricted Diachronic Composition and Special Relativity, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66 (2015)  (Published Online 2013), 235-255. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version
The Open Future, Philosophy Compass, 6/5 (2011), 360–373. PhilArchive Preprint| Published Version
Centered Assertion, Philosophical Studies, 150 (2010), 97-114. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version
Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,80 (2010), 112-132. PhilArchive Preprint| Published Version
Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time, Philosophical Studies, 142 (2009), 325-344.  PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version
De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being, Faith and Philosophy, April (2006), 191-200. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version

Book Reviews and Critical Discussions

Critical Notice of The Open Future: Why future contingents are all false by Patrick Todd. Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly. PhilArchive Preprint | Published Version
The Growing Block, the Open Future, and Future Truths, Disputatio, Issue 63 (December 2021). PhilArchive PreprintPublished Version
for a Book Symposium on Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz’s Nothing to Come
Review of Debates in the Metaphysics of Time, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, Analysis, 2016, 76 (2): 256-259. Local file | Published Version
Review of Representing Time: an Essay on Temporality as Modality by K. M. Jaszczolt, Analysis, 2010, 70(2): 385-387.
Review of Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content by Neil Feit, Protosociology, 2010, url: